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Rise of Political Populism
a n d t h e Tro u b l e w i t h t h e L e ga l
Profession in China
Zang Dongsheng

I

n 1979, China started its reform by enacting fundamental laws—the
Criminal Law, Criminal Procedure Law, Law on Joint Ventures, etc.
It impressed an American lawyer and acute China observer, Jerome
A. Cohen, so that he called 1979 “the year of the law.”1 The “Gang
of Four”—Mao’s wife Jiang Qing and her political allies—were tried
by the Supreme People’s Court the next year. Many Chinese who
viewed the trial on television were surprised to find that the defendants
had their defense lawyers! Law was also given a special meaning in
August 1980 when Deng Xiaoping told a group of officials, “Stalin
gravely damaged socialist rules of law, doing things which Comrade
Mao Zedong once said would have been impossible in Western
countries like Britain, France and the United States.”2 We now know
Deng’s political reform agenda was very limited.3 At the time, for a
whole generation of Chinese intellectuals, those who returned from
labor camps after the “Culture Revolution,” and those young students
growing up in the 1980s who dreamed about the future (the author
being one), the inspiration was real.
“Rule of law” at the time was both intellectual and political
emancipation. The most representative at the time might be Liang
Zhiping in his book New Persian Letters (1987), which followed
Montesquieu’s Persian Letters (1721). Liang and his co-authors were
playing the role of young French observers from Paris, corresponding
with each other about the Chinese cultures and compared them with
the West. Like what Montesquieu did in 1721, through their role as
“foreign” observers, Liang and his co-authors created more political
room as well as refreshing perspectives for themselves in their critique
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of China’s lack of “rule of law” tradition. The enlightenment movement
of the 1980s came to a sudden end in 1989 when prodemocracy
demonstrations were brutally cracked down. Many intellectuals,
including Liang himself, were silenced or marginalized afterwards.
After 1989, China underwent the Jiang Zemin administration,
1993-2003, followed by the Hu Jintao administration, 2003 to 2013. In
many aspects, from 1979 to 2009, China has enormously transformed
itself. In 1979, when law practice was reinstated, there were only 212
lawyers in the country. Victor H. Li had called China’s legal system
as “law without lawyer.”4 By the end of 2008, according to the China
Law Society, the number of lawyers in China has reached 156,710,
law firms 14,467. The number of law schools or law departments
has reached 610, with more than 400,000 students enrolled.5 In the
wake of the sixtieth anniversary of founding of the People’s Republic,
the number of judges has reached three hundred thousands, and
the number of courts at various levels has reached 3,561.6 China’s
legislatures—the National People’s Congress (NPC) and its Standing
Committee—have gained more power, expertise, and credentials in
law-making. In 1999, a constitution amendment even managed to
put “rule by law” into the official text of the Constitution. A White
Paper entitled “Rule of Law in China” was published in 2008 by the
State Council—China’s cabinet—boasts a long list of the statutes that
the legislatures have passed.7 Wu Bangguo, Chairman of the NPC
Standing Committee, announced in March 2008 that a “legal system
with Chinese characters” has been substantively accomplished.8 On
September 3, 2009, about a month before the sixtieth anniversary of
the People’s Republic, the People’s Daily published an article entitled
“Marching toward Rule-of-Law State,”9 affirming that the landmark
has actually been achieved.
The official narratives often report achievements in rule-of-law the
same way as they report production of steel—as if rule-of-law can be
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measured by the number of output. Thus they also tend to project a
lineal development from the past into the future. Missing in the official
narratives, however, are the recent efforts to reframe the discourse of
“rule of law.” These efforts are mostly explicitly demonstrated in the
new slogan “harmonious society” under the Hu Jintao administration
since 2006, when the Communist Party’s (Party) intensified control of
the legal profession—judges, lawyers and prosecutors. The increased
control can be most clearly shown by comparing policies adopted
between 2006 and 2009 with those key reform measures taken place
in the 1980s. For lack of a better term, these efforts are characterized
as the “rise of political populism.” This essay portrays these
developments in three areas: the revival of mediation in civil trial
processes, Party’s presence in law firms, and the increased role of
Party’s discipline inspection commissions.
The Political Setting
Jiang Zemin reversed some of the key reform measures of the 1980s:
First, “separation of Party and government,” declared in 1987 under
Zhao Ziyang (1919-2005), 10 was replaced ten years later by Jiang
Zemin’s new slogan that the Party must “be in command and in
balance.”11
While Jiang Zemin was interested in political drama with high
symbolic values, such as putting “rule by law” into the Constitution,
or creating new slogans such as “rule by virtue”, “three represents,”
he largely left the legal profession to themselves or, at least, tolerated
what they did, often under international pressure. In the first couple
of years of the 1990s, some high-profile political dissidents filed
civil lawsuits to defend their personal interests on legal grounds
such as defamation.12 These cases were ultimately dismissed, but
the fact that they were filed and accepted by the courts showed the
work of international pressure. Jiang welcomed the expansion of the
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bar and the Ministry of Justice—the regulatory agency in charge of
the lawyers—pushed reform of law firms in the 1990s from state
ownership to cooperative forms. Jiang also tolerated lawyers’ demand
for professional autonomy. In 1999, when the national bar—All-China
Lawyers Association (ACLA)—amended its charter, ACLA did not
cause any trouble in labeling itself as a “self-regulatory group,” while
before that lawyers were defined as “state legal workers.” In the 2001
Qi Yuling case, the Supreme People’s Court played an active role in
citing the text of the Constitution, for the first time in the history of
People’s Republic.13 Huang Songyou, then Vice President of SPC, was
an advocate of Marbury v. Madison (1803), where the United States
Supreme Court established the power of judicial review.
In general, political control over the legal profession continued,14
and politically connected lawyers benefited more than those who
didn’t have the connection with the regime.15 But even this limited
professional autonomy is shrinking in recent years under the Hu
Jintao administration under the new guidelines of “harmonious
society.” The transition from Jiang to Hu started in November 2002
when Hu became Secretary General of the Party; it continued in
March 2003, when Hu became the President of China in March 2003.
But it was not complete until March 2005, when Hu became head
of the Party’s Military Commission. 16 Hu faced no less alarming
situation than his predecessor: the SARS (severe acute respiratory
syndrome) in 2003, energy crisis in 2004, coal mine disasters in 2004
and 2005, baby milk powder scandals (in 2004 and 2008), Tibetan
protests in 2008, global economic slowdown from October 2008, and
most recently, the ethnic conflicts in Urumqi, Xinjiang autonomous
region in July 2009. Social issues closely related: ecological
degradation, farmers’ land, consumer protection, increasing gap in
income, increasing number of explosive “mass incidents,” a term
became widely used in recent years referring to riots or protests of
political significance.17
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In this context, a new slogan “harmonious society” was created
in October 2006, at the Sixth Plenary Session of the 16th Party
Central Committee. 18 The official statement of the Sixth Plenary,
“Decision on Several Issues on Building a Socialist Harmonious
Society,” specifically referred to the role of the judiciary and the
legal profession. Thus, “harmonious society” became an organizing
concept in framing the sociopolitical issues of the Chinese society. As
a consequence, control of the legal profession intensified.
Priority to Mediation
The first connection between “harmonious society” and the judiciary
was the return of mediation in civil cases. Following the Party’s Sixth
Plenary in 2006, the Supreme People’s Court issued in January 2007
“Several Opinions,”19 where SPC emphasized that “the judiciary’s
fundamental task was to mitigate social tensions, enhance social stability,
promote social harmony and fulfill social justice.” In order to handle
large number of cases effectively, SPC stated, there must be “multiple
mechanisms for dispute resolution” and they should be efficient and
convenient for the parties involved. In civil adjudication, it meant a
stronger judicial policy in encouraging mediation in the trial process,
i.e., that a case “be mediated so far as it is possible”.
In August, SPC and Ministry of Justice jointly issued a circular to
lower courts and justice bureaus, instructing that mediation not only
be applied in disputes in marriage, in the family, or between neighbors,
or personal injury cases; but also be expanded to broader social issues
such as land, environment, labor, and medical disputes.20 From June
2008, pilot programs on mediation (where mediation was applied more
aggressively) were started in courts in the provinces and municipalities
of Guangdong, Fujian, Yunnan, Hebei, Gansu, Chongqing and
Shanghai.21 One year later, in July 2009 SPC decided to promote this
new policy nationally.22 Now this is labeled as “priority to mediation,”

Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=1585442

84

Zang Dongsheng

where mediation becomes almost a required process forced on parties
in adjudication. As the policy is implemented, the People’s Court
Daily, a national newspaper controlled by SPC, fills its headlines on
mediation given priority in courtrooms across the nation. Local courts
are opening office space specifically dedicated to mediation, and local
legislatures are publishing their local rules on mediation.
This is accompanied by a revived fascination with the so-called
“Ma Xiwu trial method.” Ma Xiwu (1899-1962), Vice President of
the SPC 1954-1962, was a legendary judge during the 1940s at the
revolutionary bases in northwestern China. As a judge, Ma Xiwu
was not dogmatic about procedures. He traveled to villages to settle
disputes, rather than waited for the parties to come to his court; he
made his own inquiry about the facts; he talked with other villagers,
and sought their opinions; he also consulted local social customs
and practices, not just the law books; he mediated cases most of the
time, not just delivered judgments. The “Ma Xiwu method” became
a model of revolutionary justice in the 1940s and up to the first half
of the 1980s. But it lost its appeal in the 1990s, when civil procedures
and the judiciary was moving towards formal and adversary approach.
From the 2006, “Ma Xiwu method” becomes popular again. 23 It
appears frequently in the People’s Court Daily (controlled by the
SPC) and other official newspapers, closely linked with the slogan of
“harmonious society.” In November 2006, a relic of Ma Xiwu’s court
house in Yan’an, Shaanxi province, was reinstalled and converted into
a museum. A high-profile ceremony was held and attended by high
officials from the SPC.24 Stories of the revolutionary past are retold.
A television series entitled “The Heaven” (苍天) were released right
in the midst of this judicial reform. Wang Shengjun, President of the
SPC, attended the initial screening of the television program at the
Great Hall of the People and spoke about “Ma Xiwu method”.25 Wang
referred to it as mediation-centered as a “great tradition” which was
totally in line with the current guidelines just issued by the SPC. At the
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core of Ma Xiwu’s method was the contemporary principle of “justice
for the people,” according to Wang.
But this new emphasis on mediation is not exactly in line with the
current Code of Civil Procedure (2007). 26 Article 9 of the Code
provides that “[i]n trying civil cases, the people’s courts shall conduct
mediation on voluntary and lawful bases; when mediation fails, the
people’s courts shall render judgments without delay.” Article 9 has
been established in the Code since 1991. In April 1991, when the
Code was deliberated in the national legislature—NPC’s Standing
Committee, it was emphasized that mediation should not be imposed.
“After all, the main job of the people’s courts is adjudication.”27 As
a result, Articles 9 and 85 were explicit about voluntary nature of
mediation. During the 1990s and early 2000s, tolerated or ignored
by Jiang Zemin, the judiciary was moving towards a formalization
of the legal process: procedures were emphasized, evidence rules
became more detailed, professional training of judges was improved,
and code of ethics for judges was drafted.28 Thus professionalism
became a central value, 29 encouraged by then the President of
Supreme People’s Court and Chief Justice Xiao Yang. 30 Militarytype uniforms were replaced by judicial robes, and even gavels were
introduced. Lord Denning, the British barrister and judge, became the
most admired and quoted lawyer in the legal profession. Ma Xiwu
method was mostly absent in academic journals of the 1990s.31
At the turn of the century, there emerged some explicit critiques of
the Ma Xiwu method. Jiang Shigong, then a young scholar at Peking
University published an article in the newly created American style
student-edited journal Peking University Law Review in 2000, on the
Ma Xiwu’s method.32 Jiang pointed out that Ma Xiwu method could
not be simply understood as an informal mechanism in dealing with
private disputes in rural China. It was rather a very political process
in which the Party successfully used the seemingly traditional method
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to mobilize peasants and turn them into revolutionaries. Though the
article was somewhat flavored with postmodern lexicon, Jiang echoes
Stanley Lubman in the latter’s observation of the political nature of
mediation in Mao’s times.33 Lubman, an American observer who first
learned about Ma Xiwu method practiced in the 1950s and 1960s
through interviews in Hong Kong with emigrates who had fled from
Mao’s China.34
Now this is reversed. Ma Xiwu’s method is back. Some of the
prominent advocates of the Ma Xiwu methods are officials in the
judiciary from China’s heartland areas. Hao Hongtao, President of the
High Court in Gansu Province in northwestern China, for example,
quickly linked “harmonious society” with the Ma Xiwu methods in
an article published in the People’s Court Daily.35 The People’s Court
Daily also started reporting the successful experiences in mediation from
Gansu province, and Shaanxi Provinces.36 In Henan Province,37 central
China, the High Court led by President Zhang Liyong (a former
member of the Party’s Central Discipline Inspection Commission),
began to promote Ma Xiwu method in May 2008.38 The Henan High
Court even put Ma Xiwu method in its annual work report to the Henan
People’s Congress. The return of “Ma Xiwu method” presents itself in
terms of populist justice—thus anti-formalism, and sometimes anti-West.
It promises simplicity that had been lost in the procedures, justice that
had not been previously unfulfilled, as well as native authenticity that
had been obscured by the foreign icons and concepts. It insists that
the heartland, rather than the relatively well developed costal areas,
represents the true characters of China today. Based on that premise,
this body of literature stresses that China is, still, predominantly rural
society. Here the notion of rural China is used with two underlying
meanings at the same time. In its mythical sense, “rural China” is a
symbol for the uncontaminated self-identity, a source of real strength
and pride.39 In its realism, rural China also means a population that is
not only poor but also with little education; people have no resources
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to hire lawyers to handle their cases, nor can they understand the
increasingly complex nature of legal procedures. Thus, according to
the advocates, the “rule of law” modeled on the Western style formal
law (especially the Anglo-American adversary system), does not fit
the characteristics of the Chinese society. The alternative “rule of law”
model for China, the advocacy suggests, is Ma Xiwu methods. Like
Ma Xiwu, the new style judge should set himself free from the legal
procedures, and act as a caring magistrate who is willing to travel all
the way to the remote village in order to investigate all the details of
a dispute, rather than waiting for the parties to argue their cases in
his courtroom; he should talk with all the parties involved with great
patience and care, so that he may find a middle ground to restore peace
in the community.
From Lawyers to Legal Workers
The Sixth Plenary in 2006 also had a reference to lawyers and stated
that lawyers have the potential to contribute to the “harmonious
society.” But the language was too vague to provide any guidance as
to exactly what role for lawyers to play. From the 1990s, the number
of lawyers has increased rapidly. In Jiang Zemin’s era, the legal
profession was allowed or even encouraged to grow in part because
China’s accession into the World Trade Organization needed their
services. Lawyers also gained more autonomy from the control of the
Party and the Ministry of Justice. The charter of ACLA in 1999, as has
been touched upon earlier, labeled itself as a self-regulated association.
This was confirmed in the 2007 newly amended Law on Lawyers,
which defines “lawyer” as someone who is licensed to provide legal
services to clients by contract or designation (Article 2).40 This is a
sharp contrast with the earlier understanding of lawyers in China. The
first national statute on lawyers—the 1980 “Provisional Regulations
on Lawyers”—defined “lawyer” as a “state legal worker,” meaning a
lawyer worked for the state more than for her clients.41 For the Chinese
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lawyers, the subsequent two decades was a process to escape from the
officialdom and to develop their own professional identity.
Like that in other countries, the legal profession in China is a
stratified group, and different sections have different interests in, thus
relationship with, the political state.42 Commercial lawyers and those
politically embedded lawyers share some common interests with the
political apparatus thus have the least conflict with it. Criminal defense
lawyers as a group often have some difficulty with the political state
because they want more access to official files controlled by police
and more transparent trial process; but they are not necessarily a
politically challenging force.43 Other lawyers less motivated by profits
may become “trouble-makers” more regularly: those who represent
environment pollution victims, consumers who are injured by
poisonous food, migrant workers whose pay has been overdue. Still,
other lawyers may be less politically tolerable-- those human rights
lawyers who are involved in cases related to family planning, Falun
Gong (the religious cult), etc.44 In Sun Zhigang case,45 three young
legal scholars (one being Xu Zhiyong) appealed to the NPC Standing
Committee in 2003 asking the latter to exercise its review of the
constitutionality of a State Council’s regulations. A series of lawsuits
to defend citizens’ rights, that the China Newsweek, a Beijing-based
journal, called the year 2003 as “new civil rights action year.”46
It turned out, the social activism in 2003 caused concerns to
the Party’s leadership. In September 2004, the Party launched a
campaign to strengthen its “ruling capacity”, and one decision was
to expand and reinforce the “presence” of the Party in state-owned
enterprises, higher education, communities, and “new socioeconomic
entities”.47 Presumably, “new socioeconomic entities” included law
firms, which by that time have mostly been converted from stateownership to partnerships. After the Party’s Sixth Plenary in 2006,
the idea of having some kind of Party’s presence in law firms became
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clearer. Early in March 2008, the Ministry of Justice and CCP’s
Organization Department jointly issued the “Circular on Strengthening
the Establishment of Party Branches in Law Firms.”48 The “Circular”
requires a Party branch be set up so far as there are more than three
Party member lawyers in any law firm; a joint Party branch may
be formed by two or more law firms if there are not as many Party
member lawyers. Once established, the Party branches in law firms
and local bar associations then report to the local justice bureaus. By
June 2009, the Ministry of Justice reported that among 14,741 law
firms, 3,895 have set up Party’s branches, and 8,105 of them have joint
branches. All together, these firms accounted for 81.4 per cent of all
law firms. Among the 2,741 law firms without Party’s branch, Party’s
contact person has been designated.
It is not just the presence of the Party. In October 2008, Zhou
Yongkang, head of the Party Central Committee’s Law and Politics
Commission gives a speech at the Seventh National Lawyers’
Conference (the highest level convention of lawyers nationwide). Zhou
gives lawyers a new identity that is reminiscent of the old one: he said
in the new era, “lawyers are legal workers in socialism with Chinese
characters.”49 In this new direction, embracing the Party’s leadership is
the key, especially for those Party member lawyers. Zhou calls on the
lawyers to contribute to the “harmonious society,” as lawyers have their
special role in mitigating and reducing social tensions through their
legal services. In this context, Zhou highlights, “we should be on alert
on those sabotage activities in the name of safeguarding ones’ legal
rights, and consciously protect our national security and sociopolitical
stability.” Zhou’s address was, of course, not just a theory; it was
backed by force. In April 2008, when 18 lawyers signed a public
letter volunteering free legal services to Tibetans arrested during an
official crackdown against protests in western China, the authorities
debarred two of them.50 Again, in May 2009, Chinese legal authorities
threatened to delay or deny the renewal of legal licenses for 18 human
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rights lawyers.51 More recently, in July 2009, Xu Zhiyong, who took
part in the petitioning in Sun Zhigang case in 2003, now a human
rights lawyer who helped parents in the Sanlu case, was detained.52
Erosion of the Prosecutorial Power
Compared with mediation and control of lawyers, there is a lot
continuity in the Party’s efforts in controlling corruption in the Hu
Jintao administration from Jiang Zemin’s reign. Jiang took note of
corruption as a major concern in the 1989 pro-democracy movement
and perceived it as a matter of life and death for the Party. In August
1993, as Secretary General Jiang gave a keynote speech at a meeting
of the Party’s Central Discipline Inspection Commission (CDIC),
where he warned his lieutenants that in history corruption was behind
collapse of each dynasty.53 Jiang thus brought CDIC to the center
stage by making it a regular forum to announce new measures against
corruption. He also entrusted CDIC to handle the biggest corruption
cases, such as the case of Chen Xitong, former mayor of Beijing and
Jiang’s political rival. Jiang also initiated a series of reform of the
CDIC in order to make it even a stronger agency in the Party.54 One
such reform was in 1997, when measures were introduced to tighten
control from the center by (a) regular visits by the CDIC of provincial
Party branches and governments; (b) increased independence of
local DICs from local Party branch; and (c) DIC has a say in cadre
appointment and promotion. These measures were then codified into
the Party’s Charter in 2002.55
As a result, CDIC became increasingly the main agency with high
profile in the war on corruption; 56 while the Supreme People’s
Procuratorate (SPP), which is the prosecutor’s office, is sidelined.
This was a sharp contrast with 1987 when it was declared that the
Party’s discipline inspection commissions (DICs) would not handle
cases based on violation of law and administrative disciplines; rather,
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DICs were to be focused on Party’s disciplines only.57 The role of
CDIC was not ignored by Hu Jintao administration either. In January
2003, shortly before he became President of China, Hu Jintao had
instructed CDIC to lead a drafting committee to further codify intraparty supervisions.58 The result was the Party’s “Interim Regulations
on Intra-Party Supervision”,59 and the “Regulations on Disciplinary
Penalties” (RDP), both publicized in February 2004. These two
regulations are the functional equivalents of criminal code and
criminal procedure code in the Party. In this domain of the Party, CDIC
functions like the Attorney General, having the power to investigate
violations of Party rules, collect evidence, talk with witnesses,
make proposals about penalties, etc. But its boundary with the other
domain—the political state—is not always clear. For example, the
“Party’s disciplines” under RDP Article 9 is as broad as covering
not only rules and regulations strictly within the Party, but also state
laws, regulations, state policies, socialist morality, and any other
behavior that may cause damage to the interests of the Party, state
and the people.60 Another boundary question is: who is subject to the
Party’s disciplines? RDP has extensive reference to “state and Party
personnel” and provides the penalty they should get for violation of
specific rules. Article 34, which offers a definition of “state and Party
personnel,” explains that the term includes both Party’s personnel
and state personnel “as defined by law or official interpretation of the
law...”61 By its literal meaning, RDP covers not only Party members,
but also civil servants—the officials or “cadres” working for the state.
Ultimately, the ambiguity in the two regulations should not be taken
as a flaw in draftsmanship. It is most likely intended, as the ambiguity
leaves a lot more flexibility and enhanced power to CDIC and its local
branches. Today, CDIC plays the most prominent role in the war on
corruption. Its power is unrivaled when it comes to the big cases such
as Chen Liangyu, former Party Secretary of Shanghai and member
of the Politburo. More recently, Chen Tonghai, chairman of China
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Petroleum and Chemical Corporation (Sinopec), lost his post after
investigation by CDIC. Of course, the work of DICs is not limited to
“big fish.” The table below shows number of corruption cases filed
and individuals involved between 2003 and 2008 by the DICs and
the procuratorates. DICs consistently handle a much larger number of
cases and impact more individuals.
People’s
Procuratorates
2008

2003-2007

2003

Cases Filed
Individuals
Involved
Cases Filed
Individuals
Involved
Cases Filed
Individuals
Involved

33,546
41,179
investigated
179,696
209,487
investigated
39,562
43,490
investigated

Party’s Discipline
Inspection
Commissions
128,516
133,951
disciplined
677,924
518,484
disciplined
172,649
174,580
disciplined

Sources: Annual work reports published by the Party’s Central Discipline Inspection Commission to
plenary session of the Party’s National Congress, from 2004-2009; annual work reports of the People’s
Supreme Procutorate to the National People’s Congress, published from 2004-2009.

Conclusion
In many aspects, China’s landscape in 2009 is beyond any imagination
for a traveler from 1979. But if the traveler happens to be a lawyer,
she may fall into despair: the “future” offers little inspiration for
her profession. If she is a judge, she is, still, learning about the “Ma
Xiwu method,” like the 1950s; if she is an attorney, she owes the
Party and state a higher level of loyalty than to her clients, thus more
like a “socialist legal worker”; if she is a prosecutor, she remains
marginalized in the war on corruption. Now the “rule of law” is, still,
a catchy term, it is still of symbolic value. But it has been quietly
reframed. In the 1980s, law was an awakening slave, struggling to
escape from control; in 2009, the slave has been re-subdued, under the
shadow of the Party/state.
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The rise of political populism in China signals a deepening of its
political crisis in general, and China’s hinterlands in particular.
Contrary to the official narratives, what the Chinese heartlands are
facing today is not a romantic “rural China;” but a rural society
in transition, increasingly intrigued by industrialization. As a
consequence, these areas are facing similar legal challenges in the
key areas—environmental pollution, labor rights, food safety and
land disputes—just like the costal areas. For example, the Sanlu milk
powder scandal, which led to the death of six babies and 294,000
babies sickened, was first revealed in Lanzhou, capital city of Gansu
Province.62 In September 2009, a lead pollution in Fengxiang county
in Shaanxi province, causing the sickening of 1,300 children.63 Tension
between society and the Party/state remains high, as evidenced by the
numerous “mass incidents” targeting the police and government.64 In
such a context, the demand from the bottom of society for a normal
function of the law—pollution mitigated, migrant workers’ salary paid,
land taken by government compensated, food safety assured—is not
so much based on metaphysical reflection as on the mere decency of
any political regime to fulfill its own promises stated in the letters of
law. This level of rights-based discourse, if allowed, does not pose any
threat to the regime because it is so much embedded in the existing
framework. But political populism insists that rights-based discourse
is not acceptable; rather, it argues in favor of a paternalistic authority
without the check-and-balance through law. For that reason, the legal
profession must be brought under control, repeatedly.
But that is not the only reason—which is disturbing enough—the legal
profession in China is in trouble. The other side of the story is equally
true: the Party/state’s control makes law unattractive and unviable
channel for sociopolitical resistance by the disfranchised social groups.
The more popular form of resistance is rather collective action tailored
for exerting political pressures.65 Professor Peter Ho recently uses
“embedded activism” to explain the symbiotic relationship between
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political control and collective action in resistance.66 Thus political
action, either in the form of top-down domination or bottom-up
resistance, becomes the mutually acceptable communication between
the oppressor and the oppressed. The trouble remains: for both, the
service of the legal profession remains on the margin. That, depressing
as it is, is rather familiar for a traveler from the past, including the one
from 1979.
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